

# The Republican.

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THOMAS PAINE—WILLIAM COBBETT.

## A CONTRAST.

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I HAVE something new to say on each of the above names.

In consequence of its having been observed at the City of London Tavern, on the 30th of January, that a bold publication of the writings of Thomas Paine had led the way to the establishment of Mechanics' Institutes, several papers have attempted to scout the connection. But snarl as they may, they cannot alter the fact. Mechanics' Institutes, such as they are now spread over the country, could not have been established twenty years ago. The then haughty priesthood would have effectually opposed its grim and trick-begotten countenance, to deter all movement in the matter. We do not say that Thomas Paine laid down the plan of the Mechanics' Institutes, as it now exists, but he did lay down a principle that such schools of science would be more useful to mankind than the schools of the priest, seeing which, he saw, as the first step toward their establishment, that the power of these priests must be lessened. This has been done, and these institutes have been consequently established. To say that such is not a connected consequence, is to say, that Mechanics' Institutes can be now established in Spain and Portugal, and that they are spread over the continent of Europe as well as over England. Every lesson in the sciences is a lesson that tends to divest one of the nonsense which the priest has taught. Nor does the fact, that a few priests subscribe to these scientific institutions, alter the case. There are thousands of priests in England who are honest enough to abhor the trick which is so profitable to them, and to renounce it too, if they could but see a means of supporting themselves in a honourable way. The Rev. Robert Taylor is only an exception as to his boldness of saying that which he felt to be nearer the truth than Christianity. Many may subscribe, without foresight as to the consequence of that subscription, and many, as is well known to be the case, from a love of science, from a desire to increase the scientific knowledge of the day. But the assertion cannot be overthrown, that the bold and successful publication of such writings as those of Thomas Paine's has paved the way to the unopposed establishment of schools of science for Mechanics. Paine had a great mechanical mind, to

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prove which, nothing more is necessary to be said, than to point to the *IRON BRIDGE*, which was his sole production. Much of his writings forms a recommendation to a study of the mechanics and other sciences, always connecting that recommendation with the insufficiency or indisposition of the priest, as a general character, to teach man any thing useful to be known. In his first assault upon the Christian Religion, the first part of the *Age of Reason*, he offers science as a substitute, and shews us, that it is only to be obtained, in taking a different view of the operations of matter from that which the priest wishes us to take.

The fact, that Mechanics' Institutes exist in England, in the United States of North America partially, and in Paris in a solitary instance, is a fact which shews, that such institutions can only spread themselves with such writings as those of Thomas Paine's. Had Paine lived to see them, he would have been their strenuous supporter and have hailed them as the harbingers of better days for the useful part of mankind. We were therefore perfectly correct in toasting such institutions at Paine's Birthday dinner; and Mr. Henman was correct, in associating the rise of those institutions as dependant upon the progress of such writings as those of Thomas Paine's. Call him *Tom Paine*, call him an Infidel, or call him what you like; the principles taught by Thomas Paine, by Tom Paine, or by the *INFIDEL Tom Paine* are one and the same thing, and will make their way against all the royal, aristocratical, priestly, or loyal *FIDELS*, or *fidlers*, that will not or cannot understand, or if they do understand, that will oppose them.

#### WILLIAM COBBETT.

Yesterday, for the first time, I saw Mr. Cobbett and heard him address a public assembly in Lincoln's Inn Fields. The purpose of the meeting was to ask the public, or his public, to buy him a seat in the House of Commons, a buying and selling which has been for many years scouted by him as one of the greatest evils in the country. To begin right and cautiously, I confess, that I wish to see Mr. Cobbett, Mr. Hunt, and all men of their pretensions in the House of Commons. But while I confess this wish, I also confess, that I would not now waste five minutes of time to accomplish that object, in the case of either, nor give five farthings, toward its accomplishment. Upon any of their past political pretensions, they are not the men to do any good by being there. Still, if they can get returned, without any expence to any but they who elect them, I shall be glad to see them returned as members of the House of Commons, as we shall then see what the politicians are worth, who strike at none of the master evils of the country.

Mr. Cobbett has but one peculiar recommendation, and that is the manner in which he has assaulted and continues to assault the



present paper money system, and the immense taxation which it supports. Here he is both right and useful to a great degree; but what his ultimate views are, with respect to a circulating medium, I am ignorant. The question for consideration is, whether a metallic currency be equal to the management of the commercial transactions of this country? If not, and I think Mr. Cobbett, who has dabbled and benefitted not a little in home made paper money, must see that it is not, what is the proper limit to and what the proper security for a paper currency? This is the question for the legislature to decide; but I have no scheme to submit.

So long as any one person will take the written promise to pay of any other person, so long is there a paper currency in existence. There are they who think that this, like all other matters of trade, should be most free and not legislated upon; that it should have no kind of restrictions; and that the matter should be left to regulate itself, leaving all persons liable to immediate payment of their paper with metal or other property, or to avowed insolvency. The evil of the paper money system has been found in its being something more or less than a promise to pay; in its being legislatively allowed to pay paper with paper, or not compelled to give real value for paper promises to pay. This has generated the evil of the present paper money system. Paper money, in other respects, is nothing more than the ordinary system of credit in trade. If I want a hundred pound bill, as a matter of convenience, and take it, I credit the issuer of that bill with some property in exchange for that convenience, or he credits me with the loan of the bill, if I give him no value. A free paper money trade would produce no more paper than was convenient and necessary for the purposes of commerce generally. When immediately convertible to gold, no prudent tradesman would hold more than his business required, and an insolvent paper money issuer would be to him but as another insolvent tradesman, or other person, whom he had credited with a view to profit. The evil then does not so much consist in an issue of paper money, as in the law which secured the issuer of such paper money from a payment in metal or other real property. Such a law was a licence for dishonest persons to play what tricks they pleased upon the honest part of the trading public.

This subject is not mine, any further than it is every body's. I have not studied it, and think but little about it. Like all other evils of the kind which are confined to commercial transactions, it will work its own cure; though, in that working, it necessarily generates much misery. To me there seems a deeper evil, that is the parent of all these minor ones and that is found in a taxation which goes to pay men desirable wages, for the inculcation of the most abominable falsehoods among the mass of people, and to keep them ignorant and stupid for the sole purpose of chousing them of the produce of their labour. I see no other evil

or vice equal to the evil or vice of a religion established, protected and supported by law.

But however clear Mr. Cobbett might be on the question of paper money and its relations, he is most confused on the subject of trade, or what is commonly called *free trade*. He spake on this subject before the Lincoln's-Inn-Fields assembly, and I see his words correctly reported in the Morning Herald. I could not have supposed that such a man could have committed such errors, even upon the first glance at a subject. But they are errors which we shall find to arise from a bigotted attachment to old systems, to country with or without honour, and to the nonsense about the "wisdom of ancestors."

He says, that two nations cannot trade together and both gain. That for both to gain, there must be a third to give a higher price for the articles which the first sells to the second at a profit. He illustrates the case by supposing himself a butcher buying meat from another butcher at eightpence per pound, and selling it to a neighbouring gentleman at ninepence. Then, says he, we butchers both gain from the gentleman consumer, and adds, that for two nations to gain, there must be a "gentleman nation" to buy at a higher price what the first sold to the second. This is a confined and imperfect view of the case. Two nations can trade together and both gain.

If England cannot get wine without sending cottons to France, nor France cottons without sending wine to England, both gain; England gains the wine, and France the cottons. This is not gain, says Mr. Cobbett, because value is given for value; he says neither gain; but, I and, others say, both gain. If all property consists ultimately of labour, all the labour generated and well applied is clear gain; and if the labour in cottons could not have been well applied without sending them to France in exchange for wine, the wine is so much clear gain, and the same, if the wine could not have produced cottons, or if cottons could not have been obtained in France without the production and export of wine.

Gain is that which adds to our happiness, such as a plenty of food and raiment, even luxuries; and if I can only obtain wines and agreeable clothing, by sending books to France, I gain by that exchange, that which I could not otherwise have gained. If England and France were each to produce something new, and the one could only be had in interchange for the other, there is mutual gain. To say that there can be no gain, unless the one party be in a condition to dictate terms and prices to the other, as Mr. Cobbett said in Lincoln's-Inn-fields, is just as wise and honest as it would be to say, that there is no gain but in bold and successful robbery. It is a great thing to teach nations, and it will be well for Mr. Cobbett to learn it, that the highest amount of gain is ultimately to be obtained by the most free and fair trade,



and not by the trick which one can practise upon the other, nor by the oppression of the one, and the submission of the other. Mr. Cobbett's assertions were, that England has flourished by dictating the terms on which she would deal with other nations, and that she can only flourish while in the possession of power to dictate such terms. Never was idea more erroneous ; more vicious. It matters not whether England gets metal or food and raiment in exchange for her produce ; the question is, which mode of trading will yield her people the greatest amount of comforts, to pursue a system that cannot fail to impoverish other nations, or a system that shall so enrich them, as to make them the consumers of twice or thrice the former quantity of our produce ?

This subject will admit of extensive illustration, and I shall return to it. But I have said enough to shew, that Mr. Cobbett is not the wisest man in the country, and no man will say, that he is the most honest. Still I have no objection to his being sent into Parliament ; for if he cannot teach, he may learn something, by clashing with opposition, and in being examined by men who take no notice of his writings. It requires more of impudence than of ability to pass for a wise man among the multitude ; but it wants more ability than impudence, to pass for a wise man in a public assembly, where every thing said is exposed to all sorts of subtle opposition.

February 9, 1826.

RICHARD CARLILE.

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### TO CORRESPONDENTS.

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Mr. J. G. WARD of Yarmouth will obtain no further notice of his article, until he sends half-a-crown to pay the cost of transmitting it. It is a barefaced robbery to leave an Editor to pay for a parcel of that kind. For letters, we recover our money ; but for parcels, we have no redress ; at least, so says the book-keeper at the office.

The wish of G. H. is in the course of being complied with, as to an abridged edition of "WHAT IS LOVE?"

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### COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

**THE KING against RICHARD CARLILE; AND RICHARD CARLILE against THE KING.**

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IN this contest, which is as yet far from being at an end, Mr. Carlile has just obtained, from the Court of King's Bench, a *Rule Absolute*, ordering the Sheriffs to restore to him the undisposed of part of his property seized in 1819. Mr. Bolland appeared on

the part of the Sheriff, and the Attorney General on the part of the Crown; but neither of them objected to the making of the Rule absolute. This is a first step towards a redressing of the wrongs inflicted by the crown, and others must follow, even to a reversal of the judgment.

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### THE FIFTY-SIXTH ORATION,

*Delivered before the Christian Evidence Society on Tuesday, Feb. 7, 1825, by the Rev. Robert Taylor, A.B. Secretary of the Society, in refutation of the Bishop of London's Seventh Proposition.*

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#### THE PROPOSITION.

“The rapid and successful propagation of the Gospel, by the first teachers of it, through a large part of the world, is a proof that they were favoured with Divine assistance and support,”

MR. CHAIRMAN, Members of the Society of Christian Evidence, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is ever to be regretted, when the advocates of our most holy faith so far depart from the simplicity of the Gospel as to attempt to support a divine revelation upon the unsanctified principles of human evidence, because this is not only degrading the subject itself, but must greatly tend to demoralize their own minds, by driving them upon the necessity of saying a great many things which otherwise there would be no occasion to say. It is, in fact, over-doing the thing—like helping a man on horseback by pitching him on the other side! Therefore I shall endeavour to fix religion upon the saddle, by observing a middle course, and maintaining the best equilibrium I can between superstition, on the one hand, and infidelity on the other.

The Bible has God for its author, happiness for its end, and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter; “and he that believeth not may be damned.” Now is not that evidence enough? What would men have? Shall the gods descend from “huge Olympus’ cloud capt top,” to mix in mortal conflict? Will the Clergy and Preachers of Christianity come down from the sacred altitude of authority, and talk with us of dates, and facts, and proofs, where we are at home as well as they? O no. No; the pulpit—the pulpit only, is the safe ground for Christianity. We must be honest here!

It is a very awkward thing to be exposed to the liability of being contradicted, and I can tell our most popular preachers in this metropolis, that there are no men in the world more sensible



of that awkwardness than themselves. **THAT** will do, and do very well, for an Unitarian congregation (poor innocent sheep of Christ), which their Unitarian shepherds would not dare to utter to men who knew "a hawk from a hernshaw."

No part of this reflection, however, should infringe on the character of our Right Reverend Bishop, who, in the proposition before us, has admitted and given us the very particular truth which our Unitarians and Sectarians of every denomination have directed all their efforts (and directed them in vain) to disprove and overthrow, because it is this truth that gives an Established Church its rights, and its ascendancy, over all their pitiful coteries of caballing craft, and constitutes a reason for the religion of a gentleman which none of them can pretend to.

"The final establishment of Christianity was by Constantine," says the Lord Bishop. "It was under Constantine," he repeats, "that the Empire became Christian." It was, indeed! And, but for Constantine, the world would never have heard of Christianity. Here, indeed, as a Clergyman of the Church of England, I stand on 'vantage ground against all her enemies without, or traitors within her pale, by being able to shew who the author and finisher of our faith was—**CONSTANTINE THE GREAT, THE EMPEROR OF THE WORLD.** Can they shew any other? We have the highest authority on earth for the origination of our religion. Have they any higher? And, after this, shall our reason any more be insulted with tales of baby wonderment? Shall we be seduced to forsake the religion of our ancestors; of mighty kings; of sovereign pontiffs, and despotic emperors, to pin our faith upon the ruffian sleeves of pedlars, slaves, and fishermen? Must we, for the mere *must have* of a supernatural religion, overlook the obvious; the apparent; the sufficient sources of its originator, to cheat our fancy with a conceit that the royal pearl had been stolen out of a beggar's baggage. O it out Herod's Herod. We ascribe no other religion to supernatural causes. Why, then, ascribe our own to the sword? The sword is its evidence; put up that, and heaven is innocent. Could we really think that God would condescend to commune with men (though it is like our impudence to dream of such a thing): the least he could have done would have been to send a gentleman on his errand, and to treat him as such: but hanging; crucifying; putting him into a bloody sweat; and sending him to hell after it, were enough to make a *wicked* man say, what Augustus said of Herod, "It were better be his swine than be his son."

But Constantinopolitan Christianity delivers us from all these absurdities; and, though it possesses all the mysteries, miracles, and prophecies, necessary to entertain the imaginations of the weak; the ignorant; the wicked, for whose use only religion is chiefly designed, does not need to be deeply thought of by any body, and therefore cannot corrupt the understanding; it does

not require to be believed, and therefore cannot spoil the heart.

It is this intrinsic excellence of our most holy faith that has made me such a good Christian as I am. Not to speak it boastfully, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury is not a better. Yes. We will wear the established faith; if it must be so, in our bonnets, and pin it on our gloves, and it shall sit as loosely—but none of your fooleries—out of the cut and fashion of the day. The canting hypocrites and overbearing tyrants that would tell us, that Christianity requires our hearts, shall have them when they can tear them out of our bosoms. But Constantine, we shall be told, found Christianity previously existing. He only adopted, and by his adoption corrupted it. He only introduced its exterior splendour, pride, pomp, and circumstance. He established nothing else but its clergy; its tythes, and first fruits; its magnificent edifices, lordly titles, and enormous revenues. Aye! Is it so. A fair experiment then! And if these things be not absolutely essential to Christianity; if they be not the “*totum illud*”—the every thing of the system—take them away again; and my life on it, but in six years the whole world shall have said, “Good night to Jesus Christ!” So ———. If the fire goes out we shall catch the Salamander; and if the Church goes out we shall catch the Christianity.

Here, then, is our answer to the eternally repeated question, “How can we account for the wonderful and unexampled progress of Christianity.” CONSTANTINUS MAGNUS, the Roman Emperor, has taken away the *wonderfulness*, and MRS. JOHANNA SOUTHCOTT, the washerwoman, has taken away the *unexampledness*. Nay, my Lady of the Soapsuds, in the extension and progress of her faith, beat my Lords of the Fishbasket in the spread of theirs, at one against the dozen. They laid their Shiloh in a sordid manger; she laid her Shiloh in a silver cradle. They, with Omnipotence itself to back them, played their card so ill, that poverty, persecution, and martyrdom, were their portion. *She!* ——— succeeded—

“*Ille crucem sceleris pretium tulit, hæc diadema.*”

She made thousands in the 19th century, and in this supposedly civilized metropolis, recognize her mission; and physicians, bishops, lords, and princes, did her homage. She lived in splendour, and she died in triumph. Give Christianity every other species of evidence that *may* be; but I shall think ye love it less than I do, if you say anything more about its “*rapid and successful propagation*.” Are they, then, whom their Christian opponents brand with the opprobrious names of infidels and sceptics, after all the most credulous of men? And are we still to read, in pamphlets directed against this Society, of the credulity of incredulity; the belief of unbelief; and that they who don’t believe the Gospel, must believe much greater absurdities than



the Gospel itself contains : that they must believe, forsooth, that twelve illiterate fishermen succeeded in changing the religion of the world. Alack ! alack ! though heaven forefend that I should be taken for one of those infidels whom I am doing all I can to bring into the way of truth, yet, from all I could ever learn, they don't believe that the twelve illiterate fishermen had any finger in the pye at all, or any thing to do with the matter ; and, moreover, tell me, that though very pretty books, are very pretty things, yet there is an awkward difference between their saying a thing for themselves, and having it said for them.

Ere Christianity then was established by the sword of Constantine, we have to give some account of its previous existence and extent during the 325 years pending which it was not established, and of the motives and principles that could have induced that High and Mighty Prince to become its convert.

To assist us in this important calculation, his good Lordship assures us, from the Acts of the Apostles, which were written by an Apostle, " that the number of converts to the Christian religion began to increase considerably, almost immediately after our Saviour's *ascension*." Yes, his ASCENSION ! And what has *that* to do with balloons and sky-rockets ; "*Began to increase considerable ! almost !*" What an accurate calculation ! Yet, for all this, whatever the Apostles may have said, I hope it is no impiety to say of them what Jesus Christ allowed would have been his own case, that " if they honour themselves their honour is nothing."

It is not pretended by any historian that the Acts of the Apostles was written before the years 63 or 64, so that unless we ascribe the composition to the most plenary inspiration, we shall hardly expect arithmetical accuracy in the account of the number of persons present at an assembly ; yet his Lordship tells us, in round numbers, that the first assembly of disciples consisted of 123. His authority was less precise ; for the Acts of the Apostles, in the passage referred to, tells us that the number was only *about one hundred and twenty*. I should have been at a loss to have accounted for the odd three, but, recollecting that the Bishop, like myself, was orthodox, and would lose no opportunity of a good hit at the Unitarians, I guess we are to throw in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and then you will find the reckoning makes exactly 123.

About a week after this, three thousand were converted in one day, because they were so charmed with St. Peter's sermon, in which he told them, that this divine religion was all " blood and fire, and vapour of smoke." This three thousand, like Sir John Falstaff's men in buff, very soon increased to five thousand ; and as a hop and a stride generally leads to a jump, his good Lordship makes free to tell us, that within a few years the number of believers had increased to myriads, which, as it only makes them

ten times more than they really were, and is for the glory of God, is but a moderate and allowable bounce. And with this last account, we are obliged to bid farewell to the history of the infant church, as resting on the basis of inspired authority.

Inspired authority we must all respect; to its sacred dictates we must all succumb: and every body knows how faithful a Minister and tender a guardian of the Church of England I have been, in the repeated warnings which I have given to my Reverend Brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, to take care how they go down stairs, and grapple with weapons that the wicked can play with as well as they! We have no Act of Parliament to make Apostles of Tacitus, Suetonius, Pliny, or any other of those sulky Pagans, who afford us but here and there a skinny picking of Christian evidence, as begrudgingly as if it were the periosteum of their own bones. Nothing is known with certainty of what was going on in the Christian Church for the first hundred years: but, I dare say, every thing was quite right—though methinks, nevertheless, it was but a scurvy trick of the wise virgins not to send us any of their oil when our lamps had gone out.

“The mysterious darkness at the crucifixion happened during the life-time of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence, of the prodigy: and each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of nature, but not a word have they said of the greatest phenomenon of which the mortal eye was ever witness.”—Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 379. Pliny the Younger, (let us make the most of him) Caius Plinius Cæcilius Secundus, at last, about the year 110, wrote a letter from Bithynia to the Emperor Trajan at Rome, to inform him, (be it observed, *AS NEWS* at Rome) that a wicked and immoderate superstition was then existing in that distant province, “that it had seized not cities only, but the lesser towns also, and the open country.” But the Bishop takes care to omit that Pliny, after complaining of the extensive prevalence of that superstition, adds however, that it was at that time greatly on the decline. While Justin Martyr, who suffered for his Christianity in the year 157, has spoiled his testimony to the prevalence of Christianity, by not happening to be aware that there was any material difference between Jesus Christ and the Delian Apollo.

It is to the epocha of Constantine that we must look to ascertain the triumphs of the Cross. Christianity, like the glow-worm, owes all its splendour to surrounding darkness. “No Ciceros, Horaces, or Virgils, were any longer to be found, not even a Lucan or a Seneca—the decline of every thing, even in the commonest mechanic arts, as well as in eloquence and virtue,” gave the correlative ascendancy to religion; and universal tyranny and confusion marshalled the progress of Constantine and Jesus. The secret and insignificant sect, like the frost-scotched



adder, had slept unnoticed and unknown while there was virtue, wisdom, and truth, on earth: but these had perished; MARCUS AURELIUS was no more; Rome had seen her last good man; and the world grew ripe for damnation and the Gospel.

There is in the consciousness of that unsullied innocence and all-perfect virtue, which speaks in the bright eyes and eloquent beauty which surrounds me, and which can only be guilty of making orators ever and anon forget their periods; there is, indeed, a joy so sweet, a satisfaction so entire, as saints can never feign, nor sinners feel. What nothing earthly gives, nor can destroy, the soul's calm sunshine, the heart-felt joy, is virtue's prize—and enriched with this, she defies the Gospel, nor asks its blessing, nor regards its curse. The guilty only have need of salvation; and it is only to the guilty that the offer of it is not an insult.

But Constantine, the evangelical Constantine, the perfect model and exemplar of all saints, had a father-in-law whom he impelled to hang himself; a brother-in-law whom he strangled; a beautiful nephew, at only twelve or thirteen years old, whose throat he cut; an innocent wife, whom he suffocated; a noble son, whom he beheaded. So, when he had made a clear house for himself, he gave his mind to religion, and sent for the priests of Jupiter to pour the balm of spiritual consolation into his sick soul. But they, deluded men, were not perfect in their art, and the voice of Pagan piety sounded like the thunders of Mount Sinai—

“ Ah nimium faciles qui tristia crimina cœdis  
Fluminea totti posse putetis aqua.”

Ah! fatally deceived, who think that the guilt of murder can be expiated. While Christianity,

“ like the sweet south,  
That breathes upon a bank of violets,  
Stealing and giving odours;”

softly whispered, “ *the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin* ;” that was the text that suited him, and Constantine unfurled the blood-stained banner of the Cross. The terrors of a military force silenced the faint and unsupported murmurs of the Pagans; the dread of Hell's eternal blazes taught the weak that it was at any rate safest to believe; and the dagger of assassination taught the wise, that it was safest to *seem* to believe.

From him and his example have all “ religious Kings, Princes, and Governors,” emulated the character, or claimed the title, of DEFENDER OF THE FAITH: while to Him who holds it now, appertains the singular distinction of having been the first that ever held it with humanity and justice. With what morality, with what truth, or seeming of truth, then, can a divine origination, or

supernatural causes, be pretended for a religion, which never existed, nor would have existed, but by means of violence and fraud; and never triumphed, but by the defeat of all that was honourable, just, and good, among men? I speak not unadvisedly, nor deliver assertions which I am not able and prepared to prove; I have not chosen to defend myself as craft and falsehood are defended, by delivering under legal protection, or with the solemn, drawling cant, and melancholy grimaces of pulpit dogmas, which no man may question, and statements which no man may answer; but I have sought, I have courted, I have challenged refutation—"Num fingo, num mentior, cupis refelli quid enim laboro nisi ut veritas in omni quæstione illustretur." And I call on all who boast a scholar's name, or all whose research or learning can have qualified them to have known more of the world's history than their own immediate experience has presented, to disprove if they can the truths which I maintain. Let them shew some age or country in the world where Christianity was propagated by any other means than the cunning of priests and the cruelty of soldiers. Wherever she has marched, desolation has tracked her progress; wherever she has paused, affliction has mourned her triumph. Death or baptism were the terms offered by bloody conquerors to oppressed and insulted nations—Alfred, Hojedo, Ximenes, Torquemada, Cortes, Pizarro, and Henry, and such as they, men whose understandings never knew what truth meant; whose hearts were strangers to pity and compunction; were the booted Apostles and soldiers of Christ Jesus, they accomplished the mandate, or the prediction, which declared, that he came not to send peace on earth, but a sword. And now, if this be truth, how wicked, how foolish, how impotent, to be angry, with him who has told *it*; if it be *not so*, how easy, how obvious, how incumbent, is the duty of those who can do so, to prove the contrary. And be it borne in mind by every one, that the question now at issue touching the propagation of the Gospel, or as it is to stand in your vote, Whether the proposition which has been read is valid or invalid, affects the public accusation which I have put forth, and still maintain, against all Ministers and Preachers of the Gospel, not standing in the line of Apostolical succession, or holding, as I do, the indelible character derived from the gift and calling of the Holy Ghost—that they are deceivers of the people; and it is not by recriminating on the accuser, but by answering the accusation, that they will vindicate themselves; and as I shall hail the feeblest attempt to do so as a pledge of sincerity, and an indication of innocence, so shall I consider the shrinking from so manifest a duty, under any pretext whatever, as a virtual admission, that that accusation is felt to be unanswerable.



A FREE TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH OF "DE  
BERANGER."

After a nap of twenty thousand years,  
The God of us poor Christian souls awoke ;  
" I'll just look out," quoth he " among the spheres,  
And see what's doing upon earth. What joke  
They're laughing at—in heaven one seldom hears,  
But sighs and groans when men their God i' yoke ;  
If I want men to sigh and groan for me,  
May I be cursed to all eternity."

God said—and lifting up the chrystal casement,  
Soon spied the planet whirling like a top ;  
Or rather mail coach for our use and ease meant,  
To rattle on till fate the car should stop ;  
Filled too with " cates divine" for our amusement,  
But turned to poison by the heart's " black drop ;"  
Quoth God (when he his spectacles had found,  
And through them searched this precious world around.)

Mortals, whom I have made so very small,  
Both black and white, the frozen and the roast ;  
They tell ye that I'm emperor of all,  
And of my goodness and my power boast ;  
Then on your marrow-bones they bid you fall,  
To worship those whom I (they say) love most  
And have ordained on earth as Lords-Vicegerent,  
To heaven's throne of course the heirs apparent.

Tell them they lie—I spy another set  
In rusty black, a shuffling canting crew ;  
They preach up virtue, but I'd lay a bet,  
That what they *preach*, they do not *practise* too ;  
In number when these vagabonds are met,  
They do indeed kick up a grand to-do,  
Upon my soul, the stuff they sing and speak,  
I no more understand than I do Greek.

If these poor fellows had been standing by,  
When I created your most glorious earth ;  
They would have teased to have the sun and sky  
Daubed with black ochre ; enemies to mirth.  
No other colour would have met the eye,  
All pleasure had been stifled in the birth,  
And 'stead of wreathed smiles and such like graces,  
You'd all have had damn'd dismal mile-long faces.

I gave you wine, wherewith to wet your care,  
When pestered you should be by devils blue ;  
Kind, lovely woman, " fairest of the fair,"  
To wrap each sense in bliss, I sent to you ;  
I gave you all th' ambrosia I could spare,  
Without from angels pilfering their due ;

Meat, drink, and woman too, in great variety,  
A fact of universal notoriety.

I never ordered you to fast or pray,  
I never bid you cut each other's throats;  
To see you happy, frolicsome and gay,  
Is more to me than blood of bulls and goats;  
I'm devilish low, my friends, in cash to day,  
Or else I'd really give you all new coats,  
Made from my lamb—he's feeding in the dairy  
Attended by his mother, Lady Mary.

Children, farewell? don't let me smell again,  
The stink of incense or of sacrifice;  
Fear not that I shall quench in fire or rain,  
Those who may look too much in woman's eyes;  
"Drink and be merry"—all the rest is vain,  
So say the learned and the truly wise,  
"Greet one another with an holy kiss,"  
"And bother me no more!"—enough of this.

G. W. GRADDONS.

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At a Meeting of the Friends of Free Discussion, in Sheffield, to commemorate the birth of the Immortal Paine, the following Toasts were drank, several songs sung, and the evening spent with the greatest hilarity.

1. The Immortal Memory of Thomas Paine—the disinterested advocate of Republican governments.
2. The Sovereignty of the people.
3. The Liberty of the Press, and its fearless supporters.
4. The Rights of Man. May we all know them: and never want the spirit to assert them.
5. Richard Carlile and his fearless assistants, the successful Advocates of Free Discussion.
6. The Republicans of every country, and may they soon shake hands over the Grave of the last of Tyrants.
7. The Memory of the murdered Reformers of Manchester, and the brave but unfortunate Riego.
8. The Memory of Major Cartwright, Walter Fawkes, and Thomas Rawson, the undeviating advocates of Parliamentary Reform.
9. Lord Cochrane, M. La Fayette, Bolivar, and the Republicans of North and South America.
10. Prosperity and perpetuity to the Sheffield Paine Meeting. May it continue to rise on the ruins of the Pitt Club.
11. Wm. Todd, with thanks for his gratuitous advertisement of our Meeting, may it be the omen of his return to his long abandoned Republican principles.
12. May the Sun never rise on the palace of a Tyrant nor set on the cottage of a slave.
13. The Memory of General Washington, Dr. Franklin, and their brave associates, who fought for and obtained the Independence of North America.
14. The cause for which Wallace bled and Washington fought and conquered.



15. The Golden Bill of Peel, for the resumption of Cash Payments: may it speedily be carried into effect.

16. When Rulers cease to do justice, may the People cease to obey.

17. May "COMMON SENSE" induce the Aristocracy to throw aside the nonsense of Title and Rank and claim no superiority, but that which their virtues and talents may give them,

The company separated at 12 o'clock highly pleased with their entertainment.

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TO MR. HOLMES, FARGATE.

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If you want a correct likeness of the Devil, sit for your own. Every one will allow that the child is the exact image of his father. You may then keep your money in your pocket.

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W. V. HOLMES IN ANSWER.

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I FEEL the force of your compliment, and will acknowledge that I am a devil to the Christians. I am, however, sorry that you should be too late with your suggestion, as I have found a correct likeness in the person of the Rev. Thomas Sutton, Vicar of Sheffield.

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ABEL BYWATER!

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WE have, at length, an autograph of Abel's! Which the reader shall have copied verbatim et literatim with its little bit of Latin.

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TO WILLIAM HOLMES.—

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Most learned Sir, I must of course think myself highly honoured, that my efforts are noticed by men of your rank and talent. I love to tickle the great. But Sir, I am sorry you should have put yourself to so much trouble on my account, and you must please to pardon my ingratitude, for I committed your cobbling production to the flames before I had read one third. For in the first place I discovered a palpable falsehood; and in the second place a misconstruction of the term made. Now, Sir, if you had had the discernment of a child you might have perceived that figure, could only be meant there; but I think you must have been born in a mist, for your brain is so very foggy that you are not able to distinguish between sound reason and nonsense. however, I have to inform both you and your brethren that I shall not receive any letters by post,

and if any may come in the same way that your nondescript came, I shall take the trouble to send them back as fast as they come, for I am wearied of your trash and am convinced of the truth of an assertion of my friend Pearce, that the moment a man becomes an Atheist he becomes a fool; and to argue with fools is madness.

For ever farewell,  
Stultus Rudis,\*

A. B.

\* Lest the unlearned readers should not be able to translate these two words and thus know what A. B. signs himself, I will, for their benefit, give the meaning of them, as I find it in the latin dictionary, *stultus*, foolish, unwise, simple, silly, sottish, unadvised; *rudis*, new, fresh, unwrought, rude, ignorant, unskilful, untaught, not exercised or trained.

W. V. H.

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TO ABEL BYWATER, SHEFFIELD PARK.

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MOST CLASSICAL SIR,

I RECEIVED your very erudite epistle, and felt so pleased at the contents, that I resolved to use my endeavours to raise your fame, by giving it to the public, as I know you are fond of seeing your productions in print. Your epistle is so far from being cobbled, that to have committed it to the flames, would have been an injury to mankind. I, however, believe that *you* would have been very happy to have been sure, when you dropped mine into the fire, that it was the only copy in existence, as then it could not have risen again, as it now does, to torment you. As to the "palpable falsehood;" as you fail to point it out, it rests with your other unsupported assertions, and is a proof of your wish to draw the attention of your readers from the point at issue. The misconstruction is a different thing. I am careful when writing against any of your brethren, to use their own words, lest they should charge me with misrepresentation. I am not certain whether I was born in a mist; but I will allow, that, when I have read any thing of yours, I am so mystified with it, that I cannot distinguish a spark of sound reason in it. You, perhaps, issue them as nonsense and are therefore surprised that I should suppose they were meant for sound reason. Do not be afraid, I will not trouble you with any more of my writing; but I can reach you by means of the press, and that will vex you much more. The assertion of your friend is like all other assertions in want of arguments to support it; and if it is madness to argue with fools: why, in the name of sense, do you keep your pen so constantly at work, in attempting to argue? You advise your friend to let atheism alone, and yet you are acting continually in opposition to your own advice. The fact is, you feel the weakness of your system, and are therefore using every means to prop it.

To be serious on the subject: I will engage to answer and refute every argument that you can bring in favour of all or any of the following three propositions.

The existence of a being distinct from matter.

The existence of a soul in man distinct from body.

The existence of such a person as Jesus Christ.

You shall print your statements, and I, in return, will print mine; and the public shall judge between us.

W. V. HOLMES.



## JOHN STEWART.

THE following is the first of a series of Lectures, delivered by the above individual to the people of New York. I am not aware that they have been before printed, as my copies are the original manuscripts of the author, which he left in the possession of his friend, my friend, and every man's friend, Mr. John Fellows, of New York, from whom I have lately received them. The subject is the science of the mind; and though the style of the Lecturer is not the most plain and agreeable, it is to be excused by the depth and originality of his ideas, and the difficulties which attend the developement of every new science, arising from the necessity of constructing new words and terms for its novelties.

John Stewart is better known as the WALKING STEWART. He travelled through all passable parts of the earth, and much of that on foot. He was the first man, of whose writings I have any knowledge, who avowed himself a scientific Materialist, and who openly rejected the dogma of an intelligent God and of Spiritualism. As I purpose, in the course of a few months, to publish a collection of his works, I shall feel obliged, if any friend, who can, will give me information, as to the man, or his writings. Of his Lectures and Discourses, delivered in New York, I have near twenty, one of which will successively follow in successive Numbers of "The Republican."

R. C.

## LECTURE I.

The subject of my first Lecture will be to explain the nature and mechanism of the human mind, (as discoverable in its action, independent of its essence) to shew the extent of its powers in ideas of knowledge or sentiments of imagination; the first limited by observation and experience to form the matter and measure of intelligence—the latter governed by the rules of analogy to direct the influence of conjecture and opinion, projecting beyond experience, and limited by conceivability.

ON THE NATURE AND MECHANISM OF THE MIND, COGNOSCIBLE AND AMENABLE TO EXPERIENCE, IN ITS ACTION, AND NOT IN ESSENCE.

I SHALL be careful to avoid the perpetual error of all previous psychologists, or mental philosophers, viz. the neglect of phenomena or effects in a vain research of incognoscible causes. The knowledge of any thing may be thus defined:—Human intelligence operating upon the mere phenomena or appearances of things in their means and ends, as far as they are useful in the

purposes of human life, or amenable to the experience of the senses.

I shall illustrate this definition by adverting to the object or thing called the sun, and the action of intellect thereon, as what is meant by the word knowledge. When the object sun presents itself to the external five senses in its phenomena of heat, light, motion, figure, and distance; the internal sixth sense, by means of its organ, the brain, which is a branch of the nervous system, reproduces all the externally impressed phenomena, and forms what is called the idea, notion, or knowledge of the sun.

These notions, ideas, or knowledge, in all their modifications, are preserved and reproduced by memory in the order of their phenomena, as thus:—I remember the lens and its phenomena to have a certain harmonising relation with the rays of the sun, and then bringing them into co-operation, I light my fire, and dress my dinner, without any regard to the incognoscible modes of the elementary causes of fire produced by the rays and the lens. In the same manner, recollecting the phenomena of transparent glass and the sun's rays in their relative action, I make windows in my house, and enjoy all the benefit of light, without regarding the elementary causes of its action to produce its utility. Again, I recollect the phenomena of the sun's change in position, and that in the spring season, and the phenomena of cultivation, as ploughing and sowing, by which correlative actions of moral and physical force I produce a harvest; without waiting to inquire whether the elementary causes proceed from fire in the sun's body, or refraction of its rays in the atmosphere. Such action of mind upon the phenomena of things amenable to experience, is all that is meant by knowledge, and marks the boundary of intellectual power in cognition, because experience is as necessary a medium to the action of intelligence as light to that of vision. Such is the knowledge I now propose to give you of the human mind, that is, to mark all the phenomena of its action as communicated to every man's sensational experience, without any hypothesis of causation, as nervous fluids, vibratory fibres, or the unmeaning word spirit. The mind of man is the attribute or result of a certain modification of matter, or organic members, called body.

This body, with its complicate organism, modifies itself into thought, just as the sun modifies its matter into heat and light; and there is nothing more wonderful that a ray of the sun should modify itself into a maggot or a gem, than that the nerves of the stomach should modify themselves into the desire of hunger. This operation of the stomach, if profoundly considered, will be of itself sufficient evidence to do away all that mystic logomachy of metaphysics which has drawn an impenetrable veil of darkness over the study of man. The vacuity of the stomach, for want of food, produces an irritation in its nervous fibres which modify the desire of thirst and hunger in what is called the sensorium, or



brain. The sensorium, notwithstanding the magnitude of its mental substance, has no power over the stomach, and can no more will hunger than it can will the circulation of the blood; and this proves, that the agency of the body, and its attribute mind, needs not the mystic power of what is called spirit to unite them into one inseparable identity. Much stress has been laid on the capacity of separation of the mind and body, as two distinct beings, by the Stoic philosophers, in pompous narratives of heroic martyrdom, where the mind appears to separate its action from that of the body: this, however, proves only the exercise of fortitude, which may be generated by enthusiasm and folly, and gives hopes to reason, that a much higher degree of rational fortitude may be acquired by its more powerful energy.

The Stoic of enthusiasm, or even the philosopher of true wisdom, whose mind might triumph over the pain of fire; yet, in this moment of apparent separation of the body from its attribute, if a bottle of brandy was to be forced down the patient's throat, the mind would immediately succumb together with the body under the force of this new material agency. It is a most indignant and loathsome task to the man of reason and nature, to be obliged to clear away so much rubbish of prejudice, and dirt of credulity, before he can lay down the foundation of a system of fact, intelligence, and experience. There exists such a universal propensity in the undisciplined mind of man to take sound for sense, and words for things, that credulity is become an invincible instinct, and an almost insurmountable barrier to the progress of reason. Men of letters, as well as priests, have taken advantage of this common propensity, and by substituting words to things, have introduced a false knowledge, that has as much deprived man of the use of his understanding as a bandage over his eyes would deprive him of the sense of sight. The celebrated metaphysician, Berkeley, with the use of the unmeaning word spirit, has taught, that men and things have no bodies or substance, and that they exist only as powers whose action is made known to the mind. To demonstrate this he lays down a great principle, that all bodies which have a real existence must all be, or exist, in the localities of their action: that is, the tree which I think I see, being an object of too great magnitude to enter the locality of the eye, can have no existence but in power or spirit, that is in the mind itself.

I shall answer this silly sophism with a few simple observations, that will overthrow all the systems of word-makers, and, at the same time, explain the fundamental principles of my new mental philosophy.

The use and purpose of intellectual power is, to conform the actions of thought to the intelligible relations of things, without any regard to the unintelligible relations, which avail nothing to human energy. I will illustrate this truth with the action of a

chamber-fire. I know that the fire exists because I feel it and see it; and I have just the same evidence of the existence of the object fire in all its modes without, as I have of the existence of its simple sensation heat within the mind. The simple action of any one sense comprehends and identifies all its external modes of action as one and the same thing, and supported by one and the same evidence of consciousness. I cannot discover the modifications of the reciprocal actions of the mind, and its external object fire, to produce the agency of the one and the passiveness of the other: but I can assume, through the experience of my sensation, such relations of distance as cause warmth to comfort me, and such relations of culinary powers as will prepare and dress my food—and such a conformity of the actions of thought to the intelligible relations of fire amenable to experience, I call knowledge. Metaphysicians, in pursuit of fame, profit, or power, pretend to explore the unintelligible relations of things, and when lost in the maze of their own sophistry, they coin the word spirit; and every secret and unintelligible action is accounted for by that unmeaning sound, offered to unsuspecting and uninquiring credulity.

It is one of the first laws of intelligence, that no power can exist without substance to support it, or, in other words, that all essence or being must have extension as its element; and this primary law of intelligence abrogates all the jargon of metaphysics, as immaterial substance or spirit having its essence in *nothing* to give it action or existence.

There seems to be but one simple reply required to overturn the airy fabric of metaphysical sophistry. When these spiritual sages observe, that when you see an object you only imagine you see it, I reply, you only imagine your imagination, and absurdly oppose it to the only evidence of existence, consciousness or sensation, which is the proper definition of existence.

I shall dismiss this contemptible controversy of proving circles not to be squares, and, *vice versâ*, squares not to be circles, and proceed to make my purposed investigation of the nature of the human mind, with the criterion of common sense and the standard of universal experience, which the action of things, independent of their causes, sufficiently exhibits throughout all the cognoscible systems of the universe. I must here seriously and impressively admonish my auditors not to confound the province of reason with that of religious faith, by suffering their prejudices to take offence at this explosion of the word spirit as a sound of unmeaning emptiness. I do not expunge it from the vocabulary of faith, with which these Lectures have no concern, but only from that of reason, where, if admitted, it would make a chaos of the laws and discipline of the human understanding. Locke, Priestley, and many learned and pious men, the defenders of Christian faith, have treated the word spirit with both indifference and re-



pugnance. My peculiar promise is the sphere of intellectual power, or the boundary of knowledge, marked by experience; and that of thought, marked by conceivability: that is, to ascertain what we can know and what we can conjecture or imagine within those precincts. The operation of imagination, which extends the powers of intellect by projecting objects of knowledge upon the base of observation beyond experience, in the regular analogy of influential sentiment, I shall treat of in my Lecture appropriated to that faculty. It will be sufficient in this place to shew only what are the different characters of knowledge and thought, advancing its energies beyond it in the conjectures of analogy. Knowledge, governed by observation and experience, must have some palpable object, as the part or whole of a thing for the element or medium of its action. For example, the existing state of man, law, happiness, form partial objects of those systems of perfectibility which knowledge may arrive at, through the experience of social reform or improveable science, to direct and limit human action.

Thought, whose element is conceivability, and not experience, must however be directed by observation to the assumption of some object, as in the analogy of planetary inhabitants, the object assumed is not human, vegetable, or animal bodies, but only that the planets support some modes of existence as a conceivable analogy with the earth; and such is the influential sentiment generated by imagination, following the rules of analogy in genus and species, which no effort of reason can prevent. Religious faith is a subject beyond my inquiry, because it is allowed by its teachers to be placed beyond the powers of observation and experience, and to depend on revelation, inspiration, and mystery. But while I treat religious faith with silent respect, I will suffer no mystery to become a check to the progress or energy of the sovereign light of reason. I will follow the example of Galileo, the astronomer, who having discovered that the sun never moved, (though Scripture history asserted the contrary) and having been punished by the Inquisition, instead of being rewarded, exclaimed upon his enlargement, "The earth moves, and not the sun;" a fact no authority, however sacred, can refute. In the same manner, should I be censured by bigots for discovering the word spirit to be a nonentity in the system of intelligence, I will repeat my assertion in the face of every inquisitor, and recommend to all pious sectarians the following advice:—If Scripture mystery should any where have asserted that two was the half of six, or any other proposition equally contradictory, it would be most prudent and pious for a religionist, upon the detection of such error, to assent to truth, and attribute the fault to his own misunderstanding, rather than expose Scripture to support contradiction and falsehood, and thereby make it an impediment to the progress of intellectual energy, the sovereign power of the moral world, to direct and

control the operations of the human species in the worship of nature, the augmentation of good and diminution of evil in the mundane system.

The present undisciplined and defective state of intellectual power, which seems to follow the parallel of learned activity, is owing to the preposterous error of moralists, who confound the two distinct premises of religious mystery and experimental reason. What furious struggles between reason and faith were carried on in the beginning of the last century, when enlightened legislators forbade the trials of witchcraft. Bigoted judges appealed to Scripture for the sentence of death pronounced therein—while reason opposed the laws of nature to prove that no such mode of being could exist. Reason however triumphed, and attached a brand of infamy to the human understanding, which had suffered millions of innocent victims to be sacrificed through the lapse of ages to the most drivelling and barbarous superstition, which still survives in some countries as a deplorable instance that the grossest detections of absurdity cannot eradicate that natural root of superstition in the human temperament.

Bigots opposed the Scripture to Locke when he conceded to Materialists the unnecessary existence of spirit which the progress of reason and experience had discovered to his mind. Bigots opposed the Bible to Pope when he declared universal power to be the aggregate of all partial powers, and no personification, consummate and coequal in man, tree, insect, and all other parts of the universe. Bigots opposed Scripture to Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries of the laws of light, in which he shews that the light of the fixed stars could not arrive at the earth in as many years as the history of the creation gave days to its advent. These instances of stupid zeal, which bring the tales of mystery to contend with and stop the progress of reason, will insure the ultimate downfall of superstition, and the eternal triumph of reason and truth.

I now proceed to the subject of this Lecture—the development of the substance and attribute of the human mind. The great genus of being called matter may be divided into four grand species, viz. animal, vegetable, organic, and concrete substances. Animal life, or substance, contains the four classes within itself; animality exists in the substance of the nerves; vegetality in the circulation of the blood; organism in the membral parts of the body; and concrete power in the coherence of the fleshy substance. The animal man has no other distinction from his animal species than a characteristic quality called perfectibility; the powers of intelligence, though very superior in man, have no distinct character, but follow the common process of intelligence, to remember, to reflect, to compare, to judge, and to think, throughout all the animal species, differing only in quantity, but not in quality of intellect.



The human characteristic, perfectibility, which so specifically and pre-eminently distinguishes man from his fellow-beings in the sensitive system, I here offer to the attention of naturalists as the great desideratum of classification in natural history. Naturalists have attempted to classify men with the various epithets, the *erect*, the *unfledged*, the *laughing* animal; but these have all been encroached upon by the brute species.

In the character of perfectibility man stands insulated and unconfounded, as demonstrable in the change and progress of civil society within the period of authentic history. In the same period we discover no change or progress whatsoever, either individual or social, among the sensitive tribes. The bees, the ants, the beavers, live now in the same unchangeable condition in which they lived in the time of the Grecian and Roman republics, from which we may conclude the total absence of the quality of perfectibility, the sole characteristic of human nature.

I shall now confine my researches to the anatomy of the human mind, in order to develope its nature in those clear and experimental phenomena which are observed in the substance and powers of the nervous system, the seat of intelligence.

The nervous system is formed of fibres, which pervade all parts of the human body, having their greatest mass of assemblage in the head, or what is called the brain. This mass, or brain, exhibits to every man's experience various actions or modifications called thought, which is denominated the sensorium, and which I shall prove to be a sixth sense, as the necessary foundation of all my mental discipline.

The five senses of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting, are contained in the ramifications of the nerves, which extend themselves from the brain; as the organ of thought, to all the other organs of sense, as the eyes, the ears, the nose, the palate, and the valves of feeling in the fingers and every other part of the body.

Hence we may observe, that the body has six instead of five senses, which important discovery I shall first proceed to demonstrate. In all the works of nature, whether in spheres, systems, planets, plants, or animals, we discover a competency of every part to perform their specific functions in the common laws of cause and effect, without any supernatural interference of miraculous power, or, in other words, without any deviation from the universal course of Nature's law. The sun keeps his centre without a Phæton to arrest him; the earth supports itself in its own orbit without an Atlas. Plants and trees vegetate without the aid of Hamadryads, or spirits of the woods; and man performs all the functions of his nature without the aid of Hercules in the fable. This competency of human power, commensurate with its functions, is placed in the mechanism of the human mind, through the different organs of sensation, as thus:—Intelligence, or

thought, operates through an intelligible medium, where things are themselves all objects of perception, and their powers amenable to experience in knowledge and conceivability in thought. For example, the sun is an object of perception, and the intelligible medium of that perception, relative to the object, is a mere knowledge of different actions, figure, or qualities, which distinguish it from all other surrounding bodies. The intelligible medium of that operation of intellect which enables man to consummate his functions, is all placed in experience and observation, which conducts the perception of the sun's powers of heat, light, &c. to all the purposes of human life. In cultivation, the perception of heat and change of position in the spring season enables the intellect of the farmer to bring to the test of experience the operation of the sun's heat upon the sowing of the soil to produce a harvest, and thus to consummate the functions of subsistence without any regard to the sun's essence, or the secret causes of his powers. Hence we may observe, that the only medium of useful and necessary intelligence is experience, without which the powers of the human mind, or sixth sense of thought, could have no rational exercise, and must perpetually aberrate in vague conjecture and wild hypotheses, as all the external senses if deprived of experience.

The five external senses exercise their several powers in a palpable medium of sensation. The organs of sight demand for their exercise a visible medium of operation; those of touch, or feeling, a sensible or tangible medium; those of hearing, an audible medium; and the sixth sense of intelligence, or thought, demands an intelligible medium for its action. What strange and unaccountable perversion of reason to suppose that intellect can operate in an unintelligible medium; would it not be the same extravagant error to suppose that vision could operate without light, or feeling without sensation? I shall here take occasion to demonstrate, that thought is as palpable a sixth or internal sense as any of the other five external senses; and that the action of the brain, called thinking, is as clear a sensation as that of smelling, feeling, hearing, &c. &c.

If you close the eyes (the organs of vision) the sense of sight is arrested; if you stop the tympanum of the ear, the sense of hearing is impeded; if you stop up the orifice of the nose, you arrest the organ of smelling, and that sense is suspended.

In the same manner, when a patient is trepanned, and the brain is exposed to access, if you press upon it with your finger you shut or arrest the sense of thought, in the impediment of its organ, in a similar manner with that of the five external senses; and this proves to demonstration, that thought existing in a material organ is as palpable and positive a sense as any of the others. This fact has been verified by a man at Paris, who had been trepanned, and, for a trifling reward, permitted curious men



to try these experiments upon his brain, by removing the silver trepan-plate: and this exhibits with intuitive evidence the nature of mind. What I demand is the difference between the internal sense of thought and that of the five external senses? Only this, that thought having a greater quantity of nervous matter in a more complex mechanism in its organ the brain, has a power to reproduce ideas in the absence of the impressions of sense, which the five external senses cannot do by reason of the inferior quantity and quality of nervous mechanism.

When an object presents itself to the eyes, the greatest part of the impression of sight acts upon the nervous system in proportion to the quantity and quality of the mechanism of its parts. The sensorium, or brain, containing the greatest quantity of nervous matter and mechanism, has a much greater proportion of the action of perception than the organ of sight, or any other of the five external senses, which however possess all of them a certain proportion of perception, or partial and local sensoriums. This fact is verified in the anatomy of brutes; the visual nerve of an eagle, or lynx, the olfactory nerve of a hound, and the acoustic nerve of a mole, contain almost as much nervous matter as the brain of other animals.

It has been the practice of mental anatomists to confine all perception to the sensorium, or organ of thought; but the phenomena of the mind's action contradict this theory by the best of all arguments, experience. In the double action of the mind, whether the impression of sense or reflection of thought, let every man appeal to his own experience to determine this question: Whether the nerval action called perception, or thought, does not extend itself to all parts of the system? For example, when I see a beautiful woman, I am as sensible of the action of perception on the visual nerves of the eyes as on the sensorial nerves in the organ of thought. Again, when I burn my finger, the perception of that impression of the object fire is as evident in the tangent nerves as in those of the sensorial. When these objects of impression are reproduced in reflection by the sensorial nerves in the organ of thought, I have still a strong experimental evidence that all the partial and local sensoriums of the external senses are brought again into action to co-operate with their indispensable aid to reflection in the brain. If I reflect on the beautiful woman in her absence, I find the visual nerves are still called into action with the sensorial of the brain; and if I endeavour to recollect the past pain of burning, the sensorial nerves must call into aid the tangent nerves of the burnt hand to reproduce the idea: these facts prove that the brain is not the exclusive seat of consciousness, but only the centre of nerval mechanism. It has been asserted, however, by all psychologists, or mental students, that these phenomena of sensation do not really

exist in the laws of the human constitution, but are the mere effect of associated ideas, or false habitudes. It requires something more than mere assertion of book-worm blockheads to controvert the experimental action and evidence of the senses. I appeal to common sense, guided by the safe and sole criterion, experience, and I ask, what difficulty or doubt there can be in that notion which extends the sensorium by diffusing perception or thought over all the nervous system in the ratio of quantity and quality of organism. What is there extraordinary in making the sensorium, or organ of thought, a power pervading all parts of the nervous system, and giving the nerve of the eye or finger the same quality, though a lesser quantity of intelligent action than the great mass of the brain, while they are all formed of the same delicate and subtle matter called medullary substance. From this evidence of universal experience in the phenomena of the mind's action, we discover the nervous system to be one unitary mechanism pervading every part of the body, with various organs and functions completely dependent on each other, and participating in proportion to their quantity of matter the general power of mind or consciousness.

Mental philosophers, of every age and nation, have been struck with astonishment on contemplating the capacity of the nervous system, in its organ of brain, to reflect, or reproduce objects in the absence of the impressions of the five external senses. They were therefore unwilling to give the appellation of sense to the brain, the organ of thought; and thus being left exposed to mystery and metaphysics, it became saturated with every kind of error, absurdity, and folly; and this state of corruption removed it in its progress farther and farther from knowledge and intelligence.

If we consider the operations of mind in the action of reflective perception, it will excite no astonishment in the mind of a true philosopher, who will discover it to be nothing but reminiscent sensation. The faculty of perception is just as curious and unintelligible in its action, pending the impressions of the senses and their objects, as it is in reflecting upon them in their absence.

The act of reflection is also as solid and palpable a sense as that of impression, if it operates on real objects, real relations, or conceivable things. For example, when I look at the sun, I perceive in my mind the impressions of the organs of the sense of sight. If I turn my back upon that object, and reflect upon the impression past, what difference is there, I demand, in the action of perception? Nothing but retention or reminiscence in a weaker degree of sensation substituted to impression. The same faculty of perception which informs me I do see an object in impression, informs me afterwards, with the same sensation, and the same certitude, that I did see it, and I feel no more astonishment



at the capacity of the mind to retain and restore its past actions, than I do at that of a sponge to retain and restore the water it has absorbed.

I am overwhelmed with astonishment, that the simple truth I am now endeavouring to demonstrate, viz. that thought is a sixth sense, should be called a discovery at an epocha when the whole encyclopædia of science has been explored and consummated. This stupendous concurrence of events proves only that wisdom is not generated by the study of arts, letters, and science, but by the study of man, and the moral science alone.

The abandonment of this supreme and sovereign science of man himself has been the cause of the present defective state of intellectual power.

Lettered knowledge increasing the mere technical powers of the mind, and not its essential powers of wisdom and sagacity, imposed and created the word metaphysics, signifying the knowledge of powers placed beyond the operations of sense. This word was confined solely to the operations of mind itself, because the learned of all ages saw clearly, that the powers of all bodies were nothing but the action and modification of their substances, such as motion, light, heat, vegetation, and animality.

Animal life in the brute species they acknowledged to be the modification of the animal substance; but in the animal man they observed a superior capacity to form what are called metaphysical ideas, as ghost, witch, spectre, demon, magic, &c. These words carrying the actions of mind beyond the operations of sense, they concluded that thought could have no material organ, and therefore was a metaphysical entity, with a creative power of things by the mere action of articulate sounds.

From our operations of licentious fancy, unopposed by doubt, examination, and inquiry, a total chaos has been produced in the moral world. I am happy to announce to my auditors, that the dispersion of this darkness, and the restoration of order to the intellectual world, requires no effort of argument; no laborious refutation of sophistry, or discussion of delirious metaphysical doctrines. A simple appeal to common sense, and common experience, will produce this beneficent fiat of intellectual order, and lay the foundation of that inestimable discipline of human reason, which it is the purpose of these Lectures to invent, to explain and to establish. I demand, then, in appeal to every man's experience, whether his mind can have any intellectual action without an object of sense to act upon: that is, whether in the metaphysical words ghost, witch, demon, spirit, supposing his mind to be affected by such unmeaning sounds, I demand whether the sensation excited is not mere agitation, motion, or action of thought, without any object of intelligence.

My incessant, profound, and zealous experience, answers in the affirmative; and I pledge, all the refutation of these lectures

for sagacity and wisdom, to prove to you, beyond all possibility of doubt, that we can have no operation of intelligence in the absence of objects of sense, and no useful intelligence to human action, but where those objects are amenable to experience. In this essay on the nature of mind, I have gone far beyond the limits of knowledge as permitted in my discipline of reason (which is to confine enquiry to effects, rather than to causes), and I have given myself this latitude to excite and direct your attention on a subject so very unfamiliar to the generality of mankind.

My discipline demands only that we should observe things in the phenomena of their effects without any regard to their causes, and observe their harmony of action independent of incognoscible essence. For example: chymists have multiplied the phenomena of the element of water, and by exposing their component causes have enabled us to sanify that aliment. Natural philosophers have examined the phenomena of the sun's action in its rays of light, and developed their proximate causes, or multiplied their forms of action in a prism, by which means they have improved the art of colouring. The great utility of the sun's essence in the phenomena of heat is cultivation, and provided human knowledge can conduct these to the great purpose of subsistence it is of no available consequence to know what its cause or causes are, whether it comes directly from the sun, or is modified in the medium of the atmosphere. In this manner I shall offer to your attention the useful knowledge of the human mind displayed sufficiently in the phenomena of its action, without any regard to its causation; that is, whether it proceeds from the vibration of the nervous solids, or circulating fluids; whether it resides in the pia mater, or the dura mater, by which enquiry we can neither improve the knowledge, or the energy of its effects. The mind of man exhibits itself in its phenomena as the modification of an organized animal substance. The powers of this substance are diversified into four classes—animal, vegetable, organic, and concrete. The animal powers, which form alone the subject of my enquiry, exhibit their action in two distinct modes, called the thoughts and the faculties. These diversify themselves into subordinate modes of thought, as ideas, sentiments, and phantasms. The faculties diversify their modes into sensation; perception; conception; memory; reflection; fancy; imagination; contemplation; judgment, and reason. These various phenomena of mind being discriminated and arranged into classes of action and character, we form what is called a system or science of mind. By observing the actions of the body in its phenomena called thought, and its subordinate modes of ideas, sentiments, and phantasms, we discover the laws of intelligence to reduce all the operations of intellect, to become clear objects of sensation, and to controul the influence of imagination passing beyond experience.

By the various characters of the faculties we conduct the ob-



jects of sensation in thought to the conclusions of reason as the end and purpose of intelligence.

I shall offer to your consideration a most instructive and apposite similitude, which will carry in its exposition the most consummate illustration of my present subject the nature of the human mind, and the portraiture of all my philosophy of fact and experience. The simile I propose to employ is that of a musical instrument—a violin for example.

A music-master when he begins the process of instruction with a scholar, his first lesson is the nature of the violin. This lesson is conducted in a discrimination of its organism: as the strings; the stops; the screws, and the bow—not its essence in the substance of matter, and attribute of power. He then proceeds to teach their powers in the modification of sounds called notes, and this double lesson completes the simple knowledge of the instrument.

The next lesson is to play upon the instrument; that is, to acquire the knowledge of its use to produce harmonious sound or music, by following and executing the laws of acoustics or sounds in their intelligible phenomena.

We must observe, with particular attention, that the music-master, in all his lessons relative to the knowledge of the instrument, and its uses, never attempts to explain the causation, or elements of sound, or instrument substance, which he regards as totally unconnected with, and unavailable to his science.

Upon these simple principles, I have explained to you the action and substance of what is called the nervous system, or mind. I have explained its organism of brain, tympanum, retina, sensitive valves, &c. I have characterized their modifications of thought and faculties, and it now remains to explain to you in the order of the mind's phenomena that art of discipline which is to conduct the mind to its use, viz. to effect the well-being of self in its relations to all surrounding nature.

I have followed the example of the music-master, and taught nothing but what is intelligible and amenable to experience as the criterion of all utility. I observed nothing available or cognoscible in the elements of mind, and I reflected that had the music-master invented the word spirit to account for the causation of sound, and admitted into his gamut metaphysical notes proceeding therefrom, without quantity or quality, the science of harmony must have been confused and destroyed. Just so it is with the moral science; the end, use, and purpose of mind. If we admit into the notes or characters of thought ideas without prototypes, words without things, and sound without sense, it will be as impossible to have any intellectual harmony or discipline as musical harmony influenced by notes that have no quantity, and no discriminate quality.

Man is taught, by the false prejudices of human nature, to play

upon the instrument of the mind with the turnscREW or cogence of custom and opinion, like a barrel organ, which renders such notes only as prejudice has formed, without any capacity to change its tune, or harmonize with new notes or ideas of perfectibility. The instruction of these lectures is calculated to teach man to play on the mental instrument as an organ with its keys, which will enable intellect to form those notes of sagacity and wisdom which will produce the harmony of theory and practice to enjoy actual good, and advance it with accommodate gradations to human perfectibility. All the harmony and powers of the intellectual instrument are directed by the two following rules:—

First rule.—All knowledge, and all human action, are confined within the boundaries of observation and experience.

Second rule.—The highest energies of intellectual power, which pass beyond experience in the regular analogies of imagination, are limited by conceivability.

This last rule or law of intellectual power, sweeps into nihility all the inconceivable phantasms of metaphysics and fanciful theology, and disposes with its light all the inconceivable subtleties and sophisticated abstractions of scholastic philosophy. How comes it to pass that man is perfectly satisfied with the experimental and phenomenical knowledge of every thing in nature but himself? He is satisfied with the knowledge of the four elements—fire, air, earth, and water, when he can conduct them to the uses and conveniences of life. He is satisfied with his knowledge of the arts and sciences; he observes and follows their rules in their intelligible phenomena appealed to experience without any necessary regard to their causes, and without investigating any hypothesis or words without sense, to throw them into unintelligible disorder and confusion. Whence, then, I ask, this stupendous catastrophe of folly and absurdity, that man, in the study of himself, or the moral science, should judge the phenomena of his person tried by experience, defective evidence of knowledge, and have recourse to the most extravagant hypotheses of causation, while in every other relation of surrounding being he finds the knowledge of effects without their causes competent to all the purposes of utility. The cause of this direful error will exhibit itself in the progress of my lectures as they advance in the development of those rules, which are to teach the use of the understanding in as simple a manner as that of a musical instrument; or in other words, to extricate the knowledge of man from the dark and unintelligible labyrinth of metaphysics, and place it where the laws of nature have confined all knowledge, within the boundaries of sensation, experience, and conceivability. Metaphysicians are disposed to make nature commit a most egregious blunder, or downright bull, in her constitutional laws, viz. to place the knowledge of man beyond the intellectual power of man; and it would have been no greater blunder to have placed his aliment



in the clouds beyond his reach than to place the objects of intellect beyond the sphere of intelligence.

When the passion of admiration is excited in the human mind, the exercise of reason is paralyzed. and a stupid veneration prohibits all examination and inquiry. To cure this fascination of ignorance excited by the notice of extraordinary objects; such as the action of the nervous system called thought, I recommend the following practice. To compare the extremity of any object and its powers with all the lower gradations of its species. For example: to contemplate and compare the action of intellect or nerval power, from the brain of a philosopher to the cochineal, where the lowest stage of animal blends with the highest stage of vegetable power.

We shall then discover that it is but mere motion, complicated in its action, in an exact ratio of the quantity of the nervous matter which supports it, which is exemplified in the dissection of the ox, the elephant, the monkey, and the man, whose brains, or organ of thought, are found to be in an exact proportion of quantity with their intellectual powers.

Metaphysicians have perplexed this subject of thought with sentiments void of sense, and words void of meaning. They observe, that as thought cannot be divided, it must, therefore, be immaterial. In this sophistry, they confound the tripartite nature of division of quantity, quality, and magnitude.

Thought, which is nothing but motion, is subject to the measure of quantity in all other powers or attributes of body: like them it can have no division of magnitude; as an inch of motion; an inch of light, or an inch of thought; but they possess the division of degrees in quantity of more or less, not great and small.

By the detection of this sophism, relative to the indivisibility of thought, I have placed it in its true class of substance and power, where it becomes an object amenable to sensation and experience, and consummates the knowledge of mind, which was the purport of this lecture to develope.

I shall now conclude with this consoling and impressive observation, that in all the knowledge I have to consummate on the study of man, you will have less to learn than to unlearn. There will need no efforts on my part to explain the clear and luminous volume of Nature's law, my labours will be to disperse the mist of metaphysics, education, and superstition, and enable you to read without the aid of any commentary. That code eternal of Nature's law, written in the volume of the visible universe, no scribe need relate—no copyist can corrupt.

TO THE ONLY TRUE SAVIOUR OF MANKIND, RICHARD  
CARLILE, THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE.

SIR,

Sunderland, Aug. 24, 1825.

PLEASE to accept from A. Maclish, a small token of respect for your son T. Paine Carlile. When he is competent to read it, and judge for himself, it will be the foundation for further improvement. It cannot be doubted but he will first be led to Theism, but I have not the least room for doubt, that he will embrace Christianity.

I send you my best respects, wishing you 40 years more of good health, then you may make your exit and ascend, either to heaven or hell, which ever you may prefer; "you say a funeral pile for me."

Dear me, that would ill become a Saviour! We are told Christ went into glory, but then he died cowardly, and would make no defence upon his trial. Do you think he wanted ability, or was it fear? if the story be true, it was part of both.

I conclude, wishing you all manner of triumph over your imbecile oppressors,

And remain, yours respectfully,

ARCHI MACLISH.

N. B. Please to have your eye upon William Cobbett, he says you are a mender of kettles—that Register, if it were no more, damns him in the estimation of all good men—adieu.

NOTE.—On my own part, and on that of my little Thomas Paine, I return thanks to Mr. Macleish. The boy is just gone off to school with his brothers, and will, I trust, in a few years, be well versed in the principles of his namesake: principles which will be universally applauded ere this child reaches manhood. These little presents, I flatter myself, will be useful mementoes to my boys, and stimulate them to maintain, at all hazards, such useful writings and principles as those of Thomas Paine.

R. C.

Hammon's Answer to Dr. Priestley is published at 1s. 6d., and not at 1s., as erroneously stated on the cover of the "Newgate Magazine."

We can supply copies of any parts of Paine's Political Works on fine paper.

"Cain" will be ready next week.

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